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Abstract We apply recently proposed individual welfare measures in the context of
preference heterogeneity, derived from structural labour supply models. Contrary to
the standard practice of using reference preferences and wages, these measures pre-
serve preference heterogeneity in the normative step of the analysis. They also make
the ethical priors, implicit in any interpersonal comparison, more explicit. Information
on preference heterogeneity is obtained from a structural discrete choice labour supply
model for married women estimated on microdata from the Socio Economic Panel
in Germany. We construct welfare orderings of households according to the different
metrics, each embodying different ethical choices concerning the treatment of prefer-
ence heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space and provide empirical evidence
about the sensitivity of the welfare orderings to different normative principles. We also
discuss how sensitive the assessment of a tax reform is to the choice of different metrics.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence that the choice of the nor-
mative framework used to evaluate policy reforms which affect the labour-leisure
choice strongly influences the welfare analysis of the reform. More specifically, we
investigate the role of preference heterogeneity in the normative step of the analysis.
Obviously, preference heterogeneity plays a prominent role in the positive part of the
analysis, where substantial progress has been made in modelling individual labour
supply decisions based on the structural specification of preferences. The feasibility
of these models to account for complicated real-world budget constraints and their
ease of interpretation make them especially attractive for the ex ante evaluation of
policy reforms in the tax benefit sphere. For an overview, see Creedy and Kalb (2005).
The quick dissemination of these models makes it all the more surprising that,
at least until recently and certainly in the applied literature, much less attention has
been devoted to the normative implications of preference heterogeneity. One of the
reasons might be that interpersonal welfare comparisons are non-trivial in a utilitarian
framework in which individuals not only differ in abilities, but also in preferences.
As Boadway (2012, p. 517) rightly remarks, by assuming that individuals only differ
in abilities, but otherwise have identical preferences, this ’problem has largely been
side-stepped in the mainstream normative second-best policy literature’.
In applied welfare analysis, however, certainly when it aims to provide policy mak-
ers with an overall welfare assessment of a policy change, this position is much more
difficult to maintain. One wants to discriminate between low labour incomes coming,
on the one hand, from low productivity (or innate ability), and, on the other, from a
high preference for leisure. In classical applied welfare analysis, individual welfare
metrics such as equivalent or compensating variations, both based on money metric
utilities, are known well enough. But in a context of individuals with heterogeneous
preferences, comparability and/or aggregation of these metrics faces serious difficul-
ties. Simply stated, when indifference curves cross, the ordering of individuals in terms
of better or worse off is easily reversed by choosing another reference price to calculate
the money metric. And when prices are individual specific (such as wages), using this
individual-specific wage in the money metric will assign a different welfare level to
two individuals who have the same preferences and are on the same indifference curve
(see Boadway and Bruce 1984, Chapter 9; or Auerbach 1985).
To deal with these problems of interpersonal comparability, one can identify two
tracks in the relevant literature. Given the importance of preference heterogeneity for
their positive models, a first bunch of authors explicitly acknowledges the challenge of
using classical individual welfare metrics in their context of preference heterogeneity.1
Yet, they then proceed by calculating individual money metrics and either aggregate
1 See e.g. footnote 5 on p. 804 of Eissa et al. (2008), or Creedy and Hérault (2012) p. 131: “While the
difficulties associated with metrics are recognized, it is also the case that, as Donaldson (1992, p. 89)
stressed, ‘no methodology in applied welfare economics is perfect”’.
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them in an unweighted (Eissa et al. 2008) or weighted sum (Creedy and Hérault
2012). As such there is nothing wrong with calculating weighted sums of individual
equivalent variations, and we certainly agree with the quote referred to by Creedy and
Hérault (2012) in footnote 1 above. But the use and aggregation of this kind of welfare
metrics introduces implicit comparability assumptions which would preferably have
been made on an explicit basis. Only then is it possible to discuss the ethical priors
underlying e.g. legitimate claims for compensation by worse-off individuals.
The second strand in the literature follows King (1983) who implements interper-
sonal comparability by evaluating chosen bundles by means of a reference preference
ordering (the so-called reference household) at reference prices. Recent applications
of this approach in the context of labour supply concern e.g. Aaberge et al. (2004) and
Aaberge and Colombino (2013) To simulate labour supply responses to tax reforms,
they estimate and use preferences which are heterogeneous across households. But
when moving from the positive into the normative step of the analysis, actual pref-
erences are replaced by a common preference ordering of a reference household. It
is true that in this specific case, this common utility function is itself estimated on a
sample of individuals with heterogeneous preferences. But this does not diminish the
fact that (only) in the normative part of the analysis, preference heterogeneity itself is
removed from the scene.2 The normative literature on interpersonal comparisons has
therefore christened this procedure as ’Perfectionism’.3
The latter term clearly reveals what is at stake, since in this normative literature this
“Perfectionism” is opposed to another property of social orderings, viz. one which
expresses in one form or another “respecting preferences” of the individuals. In Sect.
2, we will briefly summarize how the attempt to respect preferences of individuals in
the construction of the social ordering (mostly called Paretianity) clashes with even
some weak and intuitive forms of making interpersonal comparisons (such as bundle
dominance, which we will use as an example in Sect. 2). The literature mentioned in
the previous paragraph escapes the clash by removing preference heterogeneity and
imposing preferences determined by the social planner. Yet, precisely the research into
this clash between forms of interpersonal comparability and Paretianity (or respect-
ing individual preferences) in a context of preference heterogeneity has proven to
be fruitful to discover new and complementary perspectives in designing individual
welfare metrics in heterogeneous environments. This research, summarized in Fleur-
baey (2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), shows how to construct a normative
framework which maximally retains preference heterogeneity, and how individual
welfare metrics follow from this analysis.
In this paper, we demonstrate the usefulness of these individual welfare metrics in
the context of empirically estimated heterogeneous preferences. The key feature of
2 Contrary to what is often thought, a sensitivity analysis does not introduce genuine preference hetero-
geneity into the normative analysis. In each step of the sensitivity analysis, all individuals or households
are endowed with the same preference ordering.
3 The point is not that the normative tool becomes disconnected from the positive tool(s), since this is the
essence of a normative position (see e.g. Creedy and Hérault 2011 or Capéau et al. 2009 for interpretations
and applications, based on a similar explicit distinction between the positive and normative step, and Manski
(2012) for an explicit plea to distinguish both steps and a critical position as far as current knowledge of
consumption-leisure preferences is concerned to inform tax policy).
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the metrics introduced below is that they fully respect preferences: all metrics increase
when the individual moves to a bundle on a higher indifference curve of her own pref-
erence ordering. But we also illustrate one of the major advantages of these individual
welfare metrics, to wit that they bring the normative choices clearer to the surface.
Indeed, once we allow for heterogenous preferences across individuals, the non-trivial
issue of making well-founded interpersonal comparisons of well-being re-enters the
scene in an ethically even richer way. If one removes preference heterogeneity from the
normative analysis, people only differ in abilities and non-labour income. But with
preference heterogeneity preserved, one also needs a fairness concept which takes
into account that individual outcomes not only result from endowed circumstances,
but also from individual preferences. The individual welfare metrics used in this paper
embody different ethical priors on how to treat preference heterogeneity, which, in
the context of differences in willingness to work, boils down to either favouring the
industrious or the work averse. We demonstrate in a highly relevant empirical context
of preferences between consumption and leisure, how the underlying ethical choices
systematically alter interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
In this respect, our paper can be read as a complement to Preston and Walker
(1999). These authors lined up many of the measures used below, in a list of possible
individual welfare metrics taking into account both consumption and leisure. The
measures proposed and used in this paper are, therefore, not new. What is novel,
is that the empirical rank correlations of welfare orderings based on these different
measures, can now be interpreted as showing the sensitivity of welfare orderings
to ethical choices about how to deal with preference heterogeneity. Moreover, the
empirical nature of our paper complements results from similar exercises in Hodler
(2009), Luttens and Ooghe (2007) or Schokkaert et al. (2004), where the application of
a proposed normative analysis in societies with heterogeneous preferences is confined
to numerical simulations in highly stylized settings, and to Lockwood and Weinzierl
(2012) who explicitly model the relative importance of ability and preferences in the
observed variation in earnings in an extension of the standard optimal tax framework.
In order to provide this empirical evidence, we use microdata from the Socio Eco-
nomic Panel (SOEP) for married couples in Germany for the period 2002–2005. We
retrieve individual and household-specific preference heterogeneity, by estimating a
structural discrete choice model of female labour supply similar as e.g. in Aaberge et
al. (1995) or Van Soest (1995). We use this preference information to construct welfare
orderings of households according to different metrics of welfare, each embodying
different ethical choices concerning the preference heterogeneity in the consumption-
leisure space. We then move beyond the more descriptive analysis and discuss the
different welfare implication of the welfare measures when analysing the 2007 reform
of social security contributions, which lowered contributions for unemployment insur-
ance from 6.5 to 4.2 %.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we briefly overview the
problem of making interpersonal comparisons when preferences differ. We show how
well-understood money metrics can help fix the dilemma between respecting prefer-
ences and making interpersonal comparisons. We focus on the normative interpretation
of these metrics. In Sect. 3, we present the structural model of labour supply which
informs us about preference heterogeneity. This information is then used in Sect. 4 to
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calculate welfare metrics, compare the welfare orderings and discuss the sensitivity
of the welfare impact of a policy reform with respect to the choice of welfare metric.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The welfare metrics and their normative interpretation
2.1 Preference heterogeneity and welfare comparisons
Observed bundles of consumption and leisure result from individual choices, explained
by means of preferences and constraints.4 We define preferences in the (c, l)-space
where c stands for consumption (or net income) and l for labour supply. Denoting the
preference representation function by u(c, l; zi ), where vector zi contains observable
variables, partly explaining heterogeneity in preferences, the chosen bundle (ci , li ) by
individual i is rationalized as a choice of his most preferred bundle, given his choice set:
(ci , li ) = arg max [u(c, l; zi ) |c ≤ f (Ii , wi l; zi ) , l ≤ 1] , (1)
where f (.) is a function representing the tax-benefit system, transforming non-labour
income Ii and labour income wi l, with wi denoting the gross wage for individual i ,
into net income c.5 In this framework, differences in outcomes for different individuals
are explained by differences in preferences (vector zi ), and differences in the budget
constraint following from differences in gross wages (scalar wi ), differences in non-
labour incomes (scalar Ii ) and differences in the tax system related to vector zi . We
illustrate a typical configuration for two individuals, denoted by subscripts a (Ann) and
b (Bob) in Fig. 1, where for simplicity, we have assumed away the tax-benefit system.
Ann has a lower preference for leisure, in that, compared to Bob, she requires less
compensation to work more hours. She also has a higher non-labour income than Bob,
but a lower wage. The choices made by Ann and Bob are represented by bundles a
and b, respectively. Ann works more and has a higher net income and less leisure. Bob
works less, has more leisure, but a lower net income. The question at hand is: how
to choose a metric m(ci , li ; zi , wi , Ii ) which takes into account both preferences and
constraints of individuals and allows to order individuals from worse to better off?
4 In our empirical application, we only deal with welfare metrics at the individual level, since our application
is restricted to labour supply choices of female spouses in couples with fixed labour supply of the husband.
For a similar application for 11 European countries and the US, see Bargain et al. (2013). Conceptually,
the welfare metrics can as well be applied to households, either in a unitary setting with one household
preference ordering or with two individuals each described by its own preference ordering as is common
in the collective household models (see Vermeulen 2002 for an overview, and Bloemen 2010 for a recent
application and evaluation in the context of labour supply). For applications of the methodology of this
section to aggregate analyses such as ranking countries by means of alternatives to GDP, see Fleurbaey and
Gaulier (2009), Jones and Klenow (2010), and for an overview Fleurbaey (2009).
5 In the empirical application, we will find that this deterministic part of the preferences (captured by
observable vector zi ) explains only part of the variation in choices for individuals facing the same constraints.
The rest of the variation is due to ’unexplained heterogeneity’. At this stage, we do not elaborate the normative
treatment of this unobserved heterogeneity. This means that we assume that two individuals with the same
vector z do have the same preferences.
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Fig. 1 The choice of Ann (a) and Bob (b) in the (c, l)−space with different preferences, different unearned
incomes and different wages
That this is not an easy task has been well known for decades. The difficulty also
formally appeared in the literature in the form of an incompatibility between two sets
of axioms (see e.g. Fleurbaey and Trannoy 2003). On the one hand, there is Paretianity,
requiring that, if all individuals weakly prefer social state x over social state y, the
social ordering should also express a preference of x over y. In the following, we will
refer to this intuition as “Respecting Preferences” or “Non-Paternalism”. On the other
hand, one needs axioms which embody some form of interpersonal comparability,
such as Pigou–Dalton in multidimensional settings, or dominance of bundles.6 With
crossing indifference curves, one easily shows that both intuitive and attractive axioms
clash and cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
The standard way out of this problem is to put aside the requirement of respecting
preferences. To ensure consistency of welfare comparisons based on widely used
concepts such as equivalent or compensating variations, one follows King (1983) and
plugs the chosen bundles into a reference preference ordering, which is then used
to calculate money metrics by using reference prices (which are the same for all
individuals).7 Normatively spoken, this boils down to impose some kind of objective
criterion of welfare, which might be called a ’perfectionist’ view of well-being. The
analyst (or policy maker) introduces interpersonal comparability by fixing the welfare
criterion independently from the preferences of the individuals. Otherwise stated,
although preferences continue to play their full role in the determination of the chosen
bundles, preference heterogeneity is de facto assumed away in the normative phase of
the analysis, to wit, in the step where interpersonal comparisons are introduced.
Yet, the incompatibility suggests that there is also another possibility. A recent
strand of the literature explores the possibility to give priority to Paretianity and to fully
6 Bundle dominance states that an individual who has more of all commodities cannot be considered worse
off than an individual who has less of everything.
7 For applications in the context of labour supply and tax reform, see Aaberge et al. (2004) and Aaberge
and Colombino (2013).
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Fig. 2 The three welfare metrics
respect preference heterogeneity. The incompatibility result then inevitably points to
the necessity of restricting the way one in which one implements interpersonal com-
parability. Recent proposals in Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) amount to restrict the interper-
sonal comparability by means of what is called Subset Dominance. Interpersonally
comparable individual welfare levels are obtained by measuring individual welfare by
means of nested sets, Bλ, where the set Bλ is implicitly defined by:
u(ci , li ; zi ) = max [u(c, l; zi ) |(c, l) ∈ Bλ ] . (2)
The chosen bundle (ci , li ) on a given indifference curve is evaluated by indexing the
curves by means of these equivalent sets, where λ ≤ λ′ if and only if Bλ ⊆ Bλ′ and the
situation of individual i is better the higher λ. Different metrics correspond to different
specifications of the set Bλ in (2).
The first metric, illustrated in the top left panel of Fig. 2, is based on a specification
of the equivalent set as:
123




∣∣∣c ≤ λLFl, l ≤ 1
}
, (3)
with a corresponding welfare metric for individual i equal to mLFi = λLF(ci , li ),
referred to as the ’Wage criterion’. 8 Chosen bundles a and b lead to welfare levels
mLFa and mLFb by calculating the slope of the ray through the origin which delineates
the subset of the (c, l)-space to which the indifference curve through the chosen point
is tangent. In fact, this choice of the equivalent set amounts to the real wage criterion
of Pencavel (1977), and the real wage metric W5 in the list of Preston and Walker
(1999).




∣∣∣c ≤ λREF + w˜l, l ≤ 1
}
. (4)
In this case, the indifference curves are indexed by means of equivalent sets which
depend on a chosen reference net wage w˜ and an unearned income λREF, where the
corresponding individual welfare metric is then chosen to be this unearned income:
mREFi = λREF(ci , li , w˜). Figure 2 illustrates the welfare metric for two choices of w˜: a
strictly positive w˜: in the upper right panel and the special case of a reference net wage
equal to zero in the bottom panel. This specific case of mRENTi = λREF(ci , li , w˜ = 0)
is called the ’Rente criterion’ by Fleurbaey (2006) and coincides with the intercept
income of Preston and Walker (1999).9
2.2 Normative interpretation of the different metrics
As such, giving priority to respecting preferences, is not superior to the choice of
giving up Paretianity and imposing one specific preference ordering. A convincing
argument to choose for the subset dominance approach is given by Fleurbaey (2008)
when countering the objection that the choice of reference prices and characteristics
in the money metric utility approach is ’arbitrary’:
“if the equivalence approach depends on reference parameters, it can avoid arbi-
trariness if it develops an ethical theory of the choice of the reference. Some
examples in the literature on fair social orderings show that rather natural axioms
of fairness may force to adopt certain reference parameters”. Fleurbaey (2008,
p. 10).
8 We use superscript LF to refer to the “Laissez Faire” description of this metric in Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2006).
9 In this case, the equivalent set comes close to an implementation of interpersonal comparability in terms
of reference bundles (as in Schokkaert et al. 2009). When the indifference curve is sloping upwards at l = 0,
the tangency point of the equivalent set for a net wage equal to zero, becomes the corner solution. The Rente
criterion, therefore, introduces interpersonal comparability by comparing individuals in the counterfactual
situation ’as if they do not work’, that is in terms of the reference bundle (c, 0).
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Otherwise stated, it might be easier to think about the ethical priors in terms of
choosing these equivalent sets than in terms of e.g. a common utility function.10 What
are the implicit normative choices in the three individual metrics mLFi , mREFi , and
mRENTi ? First note that all three metrics fully respect preferences. That means that all
metrics will increase when the individual moves to a bundle on a higher indifference
curve of his or her own preference ordering, something which is not guaranteed when
using a reference preference ordering. But preserving preference heterogeneity in the
normative part of the analysis also confronts the analyst with a need to speak out
normatively about how to deal with the fact that individual outcomes are the result
of both preferences and constraints. This is precisely the topic of the literature on
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, which addresses the issue by keeping individ-
uals responsible for their preferences, but not for endowed circumstances. In order
to operationalize this basic assumption, two competing interpretations evolved in the
economic literature, namely the compensation and the (liberal) reward principle. The
compensation principle states that inequalities due to endowed circumstances (i.e. not
due to responsibility factors) should be removed. In contrast, the principle of liberal
reward states that inequalities due to individual preferences are legitimate. Although
similar at a first glance, both principles are logically independent and to some extent
even in conflict with each other. Any individual welfare measure by which the analyst
wants to make interpersonal comparisons therefore has to compromise on one of both
principles. The individual welfare metrics presented in the previous subsection all give
priority to the compensation principle, in that individuals with poorer (hypothetical)
circumstances are always ranked worse off. But the measures embody different ethi-
cal priors on how to weigh people with different preferences differently e.g. by either
favouring the industrious or the work averse.
Under the Laissez Faire criterion mLF of Fig. 2 e.g. we judge two individuals as
equally well off when they have the same hypothetical net wage rate, irrespective of the
choices they make. Therefore, in this mLF -measure, differences in preferences, leading
to different choices, are considered not to be a sufficient reason for redistributing, or
for ranking people as worse or better off.11
When choosing the Rente criterion, on the other hand, we offer maximal protection
for people who have a larger distaste for working. With Bob’s indifference curve
cutting Ann’s one from below in Fig. 2, we will always judge Bob to be worse off
than Ann if they face the same constraint. From this perspective, choosing the Rente
criterion as the welfare metric implements a normative choice of holding people with
a strong aversion to work minimally responsible for these preferences.
10 Fleurbaey (2005) gives the example of the metric designed to measure welfare in the multidimensional
space of income and health. In that case, it seems natural (though not compelling) that one restricts inter-
personal comparisons to the subset of the space where all individuals are healthy (instead of in bad health).
And Schokkaert et al. (2009) argue that when constructing a measure of job satisfaction along the lines
of subset dominance, one can better restrict interpersonal comparability to the subset of space where all
individuals have a good job instead of when they have bad jobs.
11 Framed in terms of a responsibility-compensation cut, one could say that this criterion holds people
maximally responsible for differences in their tastes for leisure and is only willing to eventually compensate
differences in (hypothetical) wage rates.
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By moving away from the zero reference wage in the Rente criterion to the mREF-
metric with a strictly positive reference wage w˜, it is easy to check graphically that
for a given constellation of preferences (such as the ones of Ann and Bob in Fig. 1)
the reference wage w˜ in fact defines the subsets of metrics in the mREF-set which will
judge Ann to be better off than Bob (i.e. those metrics using a reference wage below w˜)
and the ones which will judge Ann to be worse off than Bob (i.e. those metrics using
a reference wage higher than w˜). Increasing the reference wage w˜, therefore, is to be
interpreted as changing the redistributive concerns. If we use the reference wage metric
mREF, we implicitly use social preferences in which we build in a redistributive bias
in favour of distaste for work for all individuals with wages exceeding w˜ (by ranking
them lower), and against apparent laziness for all individuals with wages below w˜ (by
ranking them higher).
The empirical application on which we report in the next two sections is meant to
answer the question how sensitive welfare orderings are with respect to the choice
of the metric by means of which individuals are ordered, and hence to the normative
choices made by the policy maker concerning preference heterogeneity. More pre-
cisely, we derive welfare orderings for the different measures derived above and show
how sensitive the answer to the question “who are the poor? who are the rich?” is to
the chosen metric.
3 Estimated preference heterogeneity
To apply the above metrics in a real-world context, we use German microdata from
the SOEP for the years 2002–2005, which contains detailed information about the
socioeconomic situation of households. The dataset is used as the input dataset for
the Microsimulation model STSM (Steiner et al. 2008) which describes in detail the
German tax-benefit system for the fiscal years 2001–2004. For a given gross wage,
STSM allows to determine net income of the household for any chosen amount of
labour supply. These detailed real-world budget constraints are combined with the
observed choices of the individuals in the dataset to estimate a static structural labour
supply model. Since the structural character of this labour supply model consists of
a specification of the functional form of the preference representation function, this
technique allows us to give empirical content to the preference heterogeneity of the
previous sections.
Identification of structural models which relies only on cross-sectional variation
in the data depends strongly on the chosen parametric functional form. Therefore,
for the estimation, in addition to the variation across households, we also exploit
variation in the tax-benefit system over the observed period 2001–2004. During this
period the German Tax Reform 2000—the largest tax reform in post-war Germany—
was implemented in several steps, and therefore, the income tax schedule in the
observed years varies systematically. In particular, marginal tax rates were reduced
and the tax exemption was increased such that all tax payers were affected by the
reform. 12
12 For an overview, see Haan and Steiner (2005).
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In the following, we describe the labour supply model and the functional specifica-
tion chosen for the preferences; then, we give some information about the underlying
data.
3.1 Specification of household preferences
We estimate household preferences by means of a static structural discrete choice
model of labour supply, similar to Aaberge et al. (1995) or Van Soest (1995). The
model is structural, because it starts from a specification of the utility function. And
it is a discrete choice model because it reduces the choices of the individual (in this
case the number of hours worked) to a finite number of discrete alternatives. The
main advantage of this discrete specification over the continuous framework is the
possibility to account for the nonlinearities in the budget set and to cope with the
endogeneity of net household income in a relative straightforward way.
The discrete choice model starts from an empirical counterpart of the utility function
in (1), by specifying the utility level of household i at a finite number of discrete
chosen levels of labour supply. We index the discrete points by means of the subscript
j = 1, . . . , J . The state-specific level of utility of household i , denoted vi j , at the
j = 1, . . . , J , discrete states consists of a deterministic and a stochastic part:
vi j = u(ci j , (1 − li j ); zi ) + i j , (5)
where u(ci j , (1 − li j ); zi ) represents the deterministic part, and i j is a stochastic
random error term which varies independently between the individuals and the discrete
points. Preference heterogeneity is captured by vector zi . As already mentioned in
footnote 5 above, we will limit the analysis to observed preference heterogeneity and
hence neglect household-specific heterogeneity which is unobserved. We assume that
all unobservable effects are captured by the stochastic term i j .
In this specific empirical application, we focus on the population of married house-
holds only. Moreover, we only consider the labour supply decision of the female
spouse and assume that labour supply of husbands is exogenously determined.13 That
means that li j in (5) stands for female labour supply in household i (with Li j = 1− li j
denoting leisure time of the wife in household i), whereas ci j refers to household net
income. The latter consists of labour income of the wife and puts the exogenously
determined labour income of the husband into non-labour income.
Similar to Aaberge et al. (2004) we use a Box-Cox functional form to specify the
deterministic part of the utility function in (5):
u(ci j , (1 − li j ); zi ) = βc
c
αc
i j − 1
αc




13 We choose to focus on married couples since the economic literature e.g. Blundell and McCurdy (1999)
has shown that behavioural labour supply responses of married women are particularly important.
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where preference heterogeneity is introduced by means of taste shifters in the following
form:
βL(zi ) = βL0 + β ′L1zi , (7)
and vector zi includes the age of both spouses, educational dummies, the number and
age of children and a regional dummy. Preferences are determined by the parameters
βc, βL0, β ′L1, αc and αL . The β-parameters determine the marginal utility of con-
sumption and leisure, whereas the α-parameters determine the concavity of the utility
function.
We are aware that the chosen functional form is relatively simple. But its main
advantage is that it makes the calculation of the welfare metrics relatively straightfor-
ward. Moreover, more flexible specifications, in particular by inserting choice-specific
intercepts, would certainly improve the model fit. But they come at the cost of a clear
economic interpretation, which in terms of our aim to interpret preference heterogene-
ity in normative terms is a major disadvantage.14
The estimation procedure is based on the assumption that the error terms i j are i.i.d.
and follow an extreme value distribution. This gives an expression of the probability
for each discrete working alternative, which results in the well-known conditional
logit framework that can be estimated by maximum likelihood. We want to focus
on the calculation of the welfare metrics and not on the most sophisticated labour
supply model, as e.g. in Aaberge et al. (2004) or Blundell and Shephard (2012).
Therefore, we make some simplifying assumptions in the estimation procedure. As
already mentioned above, we do not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Haan
(2006) has shown that unobserved heterogeneity does not significantly affect the labour
supply elasticities when using a similar specification with cross-sectional data. Nor
do we model potential restrictions on the labour market as in Aaberge et al. (2004) or
Bargain et al. (2010). The findings of Bargain et al. (2010) imply that demand side
constraints bias elasticities in particular for men and single women, but tend to be less
severe for the labour supply decision of married women.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
SOEP is a representative household survey for Germany with sufficient socioeconomic
information to derive the budget line of a household i.e. the net household income,
and to estimate labour supply behaviour.15 For this analysis, we use the data collected
in 2002–2005, with income information about the tax years 2001–2004. We restrict
the sample to married households with a wife aged between 20 and 60 who is not self-
employed, retired or in full-time education. Moreover, we consider only households
in which the husband is working full time i.e. more than 30 h per week. This gives us
a sample of 9455 observations. For female labour supply, we define J = 5 discrete
14 To guarantee positive first derivatives with respect to consumption and leisure, transformations of the
coefficients might be necessary. But in our empirical application, the first derivatives were found to be
positive for all households.
15 For a detailed description of the SOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007).
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working alternatives: non-participation, two part time alternatives, full-time work and
overtime.16
To derive net household income according to the tax legislation in Germany for the
observed years at each discrete alternative of working hours, we use the microsim-
ulation model STSM (Steiner et al. 2008). The microsimulation model captures all
relevant rules of the tax-benefit system including the changes following the Tax Reform
2000, mentioned above.17 More precisely, we use the microsimulation model to cal-
culate gross household earnings as the sum of observed earnings of the husband and
the state-specific earnings of the wife for each discrete hours point. Gross earnings of
the wife are simply the state-specific hours multiplied by her expected market wage.
For working women, we take the observed wage information as their market wage,
while for the non-working, we impute an expected market wage using an estimated
wage equation with selection correction. The wage equation includes the relevant
individual-specific information such as education and experience and is separately
estimated for women in East and West Germany. As an exclusion restriction, we rely,
as is common in the literature, on non-labour income of the wife, in particular the
earnings of the husband, and on the number of children younger than school age. For
a more detailed discussion of the wage estimation and a presentation of the empirical
results for a slightly different sample, namely married women aged 20–55, see Haan
(2010). 18 The information on gross earnings is the key input for the microsimulation
model which describes, in detail, all relevant transfer programmes, social security
contributions and income taxation and which delivers the state-specific net household
income ci j . Leisure time at each hours point is simply the time endowment T = 80
minus working time.
Table 1 shows the overall distribution of the households at the five alternatives. We
also show average working hours and average monthly net household income and the
shares by region, by education level and by the presence of children younger than
3 years old. The data reveal the relatively low labour market attachment of married
women. About 30 % of all married women are not working, slightly over 40 % works
part time and less than a quarter of all married women work regular hours or more. Since
in our sample, all husbands work at least 30 h, the net household income distribution
between the five discrete states is not very unequal. In addition, this is partly related
to the joint taxation with full splitting which leads to high marginal tax rates for the
secondary earner.
Table 1 shows interesting differences in the distribution across the employment
states by region, education and family composition. In our sample, roughly 20 % of
all households live in East Germany, but we only find 13 % East Germans amongst
16 The median of the empirical distribution in the following intervals define the discrete points: 0, [0–15],
[16–34], [35–40], > 40. The estimation results are robust to changes in the approximation of the distribution
of working hours.
17 In several papers, e.g. Bargain et al. (2010), the effect of the tax-benefit system on the working incentives
are discussed in detail by analysing budget lines for different household types. Given the focus of this paper,
which is on the normative analysis, we refer the reader to the previous studies for a detailed account of the
translation of the German tax-benefit system into budget constraints.
18 Estimation results for this wage equation can be obtained by the authors upon request.
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Table 1 Discrete employment states












1 Not working 30.2 0 2,727 13.7 16.8 27.2
2 0–15 h 16.3 10 3,048 5.6 13.9 14.1
3 16–34 h 28.1 23 3,353 18.5 7.8 4.8
4 35–40 h 19.7 38 3,744 40.6 9.0 2.1
5 >40 h 5.8 42 3,876 49.5 3.5 2.9
The sample consists of 9,455 married households where the husband is working at least 30 h. The second
column gives median working hours for the intervals 0, [0–15], [16–34], [35–40], > 40, and this median
is used to define the discrete employment states. The share of East German households in the population
is 20 %, 11.5 % of all women are low educated, i.e. 9 years of school or less, and 12.4 % of all households
have a child younger 3 years. Source: SOEP, wave 2002–2005 and STSM
the non-working women, and even less amongst part time work. On the other hand,
the share of East Germans in the subset of households where the wife is working full
time is close to 40 %. For overtime work, the overrepresentation of East Germans is
even larger. By education, we find that amongst non-working women, the share of low
educated is above the average. The opposite holds for the family composition. Close
to 30 % of non-working women have a child younger than three years, as opposed to
only 3 % of those working full time or more hours.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters of the Box-Cox utility function in (6).
Parameters αc and αL , both smaller than 1, indicate that the utility function is
concave with respect to consumption and leisure time. For consumption, the curvature
comes close to a logarithmic functional form (which would be the case if αc = 0),
and the concavity is more pronounced for leisure. As expected, households value
consumption positively (βc = 3.134 being positive) and - on average - women also
value leisure time positively (βL0 = 0.799). However, we find significant preference
heterogeneity by observable characteristics. In line with previous studies, we find that
the taste for leisure increases with the presence of children, in particular for children
younger than 3 years. We find positive effects of the educational dummies, where the
reference category is high education. This implies that ceteris paribus women with
low and medium education have a higher preference for leisure than women with the
highest educational degree. Finally, we find important differences between women in
East and West Germany. In line with the descriptive statistics of Table 1, women in
West Germany have a significantly lower inclination to work. This different pattern in
female employment behaviour has often been analysed and is mainly explained by the
different history and socialization of the two parts of Germany before the reunification.
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Table 2 Estimated parameters
of Box-Cox utility function
αc and αL determine the
concavity of the utility function
with respect to consumption and
leisure. βc and βL determine the
marginal utility of consumption
and leisure. Estimation includes
time dummies. Source: SOEP,








β ′L1 (taste shifter dummies)
Age of wife 2.168 0.533
Age of husband −0.638 0.472
Child younger than 3 2.267 0.205
Child between 4 and 6 1.052 0.106
East Germany −0.891 0.087
Low education 0.354 0.074
Medium education 0.295 0.051
αL −1.527 0.134
Before we turn to a more detailed discussion of the preference heterogeneity in
our estimated model, we provide evidence on the model fit in Table 3. As discussed
above, our chosen functional form is fairly simple and therefore less flexible than
in other studies e.g. Van Soest (1995). The advantage of this functional form, how-
ever, is a clear economic interpretation and the possibility to calculate the welfare
metrics in a straightforward way. Moreover, despite the restriction in flexibility, the
estimated parameters enable to reproduce fairly accurately all important features
of the observed data presented in Table 1. This is demonstrated in Table 3 which
shows observed and predicted (sub)-population shares at the different discrete states
of labour supply. We predict the share of non-working women, of women working
less than full time and of women working full time and more, quite precisely. Even
more important for our application is that also the observed and predicted shares in
the different sub-populations match quite well. Our estimated model replicates the
increasing share of East German women by working hours, as well as the relatively
higher share of women with children and of low-educated women in the non-working
subgroup.
In Table 4, we present the preference heterogeneity by means of the variation in
the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) for different subgroups. Given that for com-
putational reasons, we derive the welfare metrics only for households observed in the
year 2004, see next section for a more detailed explanation; we discuss the preference
heterogeneity only for this population. The table includes the (sub)-population mean
and the related standard deviations. For all households in the sample, we calculated
the slope of the indifference curve at the same bundle of 40 h of weekly labour supply,
and a net monthly income of 2,000 euros. Note, that for the calculation of the MRS, we
only make use of the deterministic part of the utility function and neglect the stochastic
part. In this respect, we consider the MRS only as a convenient summary of all esti-
mated coefficients of the preferences. However, as discussed below, we will account
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Table 3 Fit of the model: observed and predicted share of households in different employment states
Employment status Subsample of households






Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. pred.
1 Not working 30.2 26.3 13.7 11.0 16.8 14.6 27.2 24.7
2 0–15 h 16.3 27.0 5.6 14.0 13.9 13.8 14.1 16.5
3 16–34 h 28.1 21.4 18.5 18.5 7.8 11.3 4.8 7.1
4 35–40 h 19.7 13.6 40.6 37.2 9.0 6.8 2.1 1.0
5 >40h 5.8 11.7 49.5 47.3 3.5 5.1 2.9 0.4
The sample consists of 9,455 married households where the husband is working at least 30 h. The second
column gives median working hours for the intervals 0, [0–15], [16–34], [35–40], > 40, and this median
is used to define the discrete employment states. ’obs’ indicates the observed share and ‘pred’ the share
predicted by the model. The share of East German households in the population is 20 %, 11.5 % of all
women are low educated, i.e. 9 years of school or less, and 12.4 % of all households have a child younger
3 years. Source: SOEP, wave 2002–2005 and STSM
for the stochastic part in the calculation of empirical magnitudes such as labour supply
elasticities and for welfare metrics.
The results are striking. On average, the MRS in this bundle is 8 euros, but the
variation is large. According to the estimated preferences, East German women are
willing to work an additional hour for less than half the compensation asked by West
German women (4 compared to 9.1). The presence of young children increases the
distaste for work dramatically. The slope of the indifference curves for lower-educated
people is steeper than for higher-educated ones, and contrary to what one would expect,
the preference for work is not lower, but higher for females above 55.
At the bottom of Table 4, we also provide information about the size of the behav-
ioural responses with respect to changes in financial incentives by simulating labour
supply elasticities. In particular, we increase female gross wages by 1 %, and given the
estimated parameters, we simulate relative changes in expected average participation
rates and the relative change in expected weekly working hours. Expected values are
calculated as weighted averages of the different employment states, where we use the
conditional logit probabilities related to the stochastic element of the utility function
for the J discrete labour market choices as weights. In addition to the point estimates,
we also present bootstrapped confidence intervals.19 The magnitude of the elasticities
is very much in line with previous studies and suggests that women only modestly
respond to changes in their budget line.
3.4 Empirical welfare metrics
To calculate the welfare metrics defined in Sect. 2 using the preferences estimated
in this section, we simulated for each household in the sample expected labour sup-
19 We use a parametric bootstrap with 1000 draws from the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
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Table 4 Marginal rates of
substitution for different groups
Marginal rates of substitution
were calculated in the bundle
(c, l) = (2000, 40). Labour
supply elasticities were obtained
by increasing female gross
wages by 1 %. Source: SOEP






Whole sample 8.0 4.2
West German household 9.1 3.9
East German household 4.0 3.2
Children younger than 3 17.5 2.9
Children younger than 6 13.9 4.6
Low education 9.7 3.5
Medium education 9.1 3.5
High education 7.3 4.5
Female younger than 25 11.0 6.4
Female between 25 and 55 8.1 4.3
Female older than 55 6.9 2.2
Labour supply elasticities of 1 % increase in gross wages
Change in participation rate (in %) 0.178 (0.166–0.186)
Change in working hours (in %) 0.439 (0.410–0.473)
ply, expected disposable income and the expected welfare metric. For the latter, we
followed the same approach as for the other expected values i.e. we first calculate
the welfare metrics at each discrete labour market state, and then, in a second step,
we calculate the expected values as a weighted average, using the probabilities for
the J discrete choices as weights. Using expected values actually integrates out the
random term in the welfare metrics. To calculate the welfare metrics at each of the
discrete states, we used the analytical or numerical procedure described in the working
paper version of this paper (Decoster and Haan 2010). Since the numerical procedures
are computationally demanding, we decided to reduce the sample size to the 2,077
households which were observed in 2004 for the calculation of the welfare metrics.
4 Who are the poor? Who are the rich? Who are the gainers? Who are the
losers?
We present the sensitivity of the welfare ordering to the chosen normative framework
for individual welfare measurement in three stages. First, we compare the ordering
of households from worst to best-off for each welfare metric in a stylised setting
where we removed differences in budget constraints, and households only differ in
their preferences. Next, we produce an analogous picture for our real-world sample
of households, where differences in preferences interact with differences in gross
wage rates and non-labour income. Finally, we also investigate the sensitivity of a
distribution of gainers and losers of a tax reform for the chosen welfare metrics.
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Fig. 3 Expected labour supply and net income for 24 stylized households
4.1 Results for 24 stylised households
We defined a set of stylised households by fixing the female gross wage at e 10 in a
household where the husband is working full time (38 h a week) at a gross wage of
e 15 per hour. The combination of two regional values (E for East and W for West
German), the possibility that children younger than 3 are present (K if present, N if
not), three levels of education (L for low, M for medium and H for high) and two
selected ages (25 and 45) produce 24 typical households. With given gross female
wage and a given non-labour income, these stylized households then only differ in
two respects: (i) in their preferences and (ii) in whether they are eligible for child
benefits.
Figure 3 shows the results of simulating labour supply for the females in these
households, and the corresponding monthly net income. All results are in expected
values. The preference heterogeneity induces large variations in labour supply behav-
iour, ranging from about 6 h a week to nearly 30 h a week. All households choose
a bundle on the budget constraint, and the figure clearly reveals the upward shift of
the budget constraint due to the presence of child allowances in the tax-benefit sys-
tem. Besides the effect of young children, the figure mainly illustrates that females in
Eastern German households, in general, work more than Western German ones. The
whole northeast part of Fig. 3 is made up of East German households. Only if they
received less education and are older (in this case 45 years old, see label ENL45), they
reduce their labour supply.
The different choices in Fig. 3 obviously lead to different net incomes for the
households. Apart from child allowances, working more also leads to a higher net
income of the household, since all households have the same gross wage and the
same non-labour income. Therefore, the young East German household with no kids
and high education who works most (label ENH25) is considered to be the best-off in
terms of net income, whereas the older West German household with kids and a middle
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w˜ = e 7
Wage
criterion mLF
WKL45 6.9 2,382 1 6 17 24
WKM45 7.0 2,385 2 7 19 23
WKL25 7.5 2,397 3 8 21 22
WKH45 7.6 2,399 4 9 22 21
WKM25 7.6 2,400 5 10 23 20
WKH25 8.3 2,416 6 11 24 19
WNL45 15.5 2,421 7 1 12 12
EKL45 8.9 2,430 8 12 20 18
WNM45 16.0 2,431 9 2 11 11
EKM45 9.1 2,434 10 13 18 17
EKL25 9.9 2,453 11 14 16 16
EKH45 10.0 2,456 12 15 15 15
EKM25 10.1 2,458 13 16 14 14
WNL25 18.0 2,477 14 3 10 10
EKH25 11.3 2,485 15 17 13 13
WNH45 18.4 2,485 16 4 9 9
WNM25 18.5 2,489 17 5 8 8
WNH25 21.3 2,552 18 18 7 7
ENL45 23.7 2,604 19 19 6 6
ENM45 24.3 2,619 20 20 5 5
ENL25 27.0 2,678 21 21 4 4
ENH45 27.4 2,688 22 22 3 3
ENM25 27.6 2,692 23 23 2 2
ENH25 30.5 2,758 24 24 1 1
The label of a household in the first column is composed of four characteristics, (ABCD) resp. indicating,
West/East, Kids/No kids, Low, Medium or High education, and age of the female in the household.
education level (label WKL45) who supplies the lowest amount of labour is considered
to be the worst-off in income terms. This is presented in Table 5, where we have ranked
the 24 typical families in increasing order of net income. The different columns show
the position in the welfare ordering of each household according to different welfare
metrics, “1”, indicating the worst-off household and “24” the best-off one.
The sensitivity of the answer to the obviously relevant policy question “who are the
poor? who are the rich?” to the normative choices underlying the different welfare met-
rics is tremendous. Household WKL45 is the poorest in terms of income, but quickly
moves up the ladder of the welfare distribution when leisure is taken into account.
Moreover, its position heavily depends on how the policy maker or social analyst
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Fig. 4 Rank correlation between the ranking on the basis of net income and each of the three individual
welfare metrics
weighs its preference characteristics relative to households who have preferences that
are more favourable to supply labour. With the wage criterion e.g. which explicitly
ignores differences in net incomes resulting from differences in preferences if gross
wages are equal, the same household WKL45 ends up as the best-off household in the
welfare distribution (rank 24 in the rightmost column of Table 5). The reverse holds
for the household which is classified as best-off in net income terms (ENH25). With
the wage criterion, this richest household is considered to be the worst-off (rank 1 on
the bottom row of the rightmost column). These rerankings in the welfare ordering,
based on clearly specified individual welfare metrics for this subset of households who
only differ in their preferences, are striking. Preference heterogeneity not only matters
in the positive analysis (to predict behaviour as precise as possible), it also matters
in the normative phase of the analysis. Once the policy maker has chosen to respect
preferences, he also has to make his weighing of differences in preferences explicit.
Not unexpectedly, the degree to which he holds people responsible for their distaste
for work dramatically determines the welfare ordering.
4.2 Welfare metrics for the population
The results of the previous subsection are exacerbated if, besides preference hetero-
geneity, we also introduce differences in gross wages and non-labour incomes. This
is illustrated in Fig. 4 which compares the welfare orderings for the different welfare
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Table 6 Composition of
quintiles of the welfare ordering
for different welfare metrics
This table presents the
population shares of three
demographic subgroups in the
quintiles of different welfare
orderings. Expected Welfare
effects are derived from
simulated labour supply
behaviour. Source: SOEP, wave
2005; Number of observations:
2,077










Share of East German households (20%)
1 33.9 31.7 51.0 66.3
2 22.7 20.5 19.5 14.5
3 16.6 17.5 9.9 10.3
4 14.2 16.4 11.1 6.5
5 14.7 15.9 10.6 4.3
Share of households with low education (11%)
1 21.6 20.7 13.7 7.5
2 14.0 13.3 16.1 16.1
3 11.1 12.0 14.7 15.1
4 6.5 7.0 8.0 10.1
5 2.4 2.7 3.1 6.7
Share of hh’s with children younger than 3 (11.5%)
1 14.9 11.8 3.6 0.0
2 14.9 14.9 13.7 1.4
3 9.9 11.1 13.5 2.9
4 9.4 10.4 15.7 13.0
5 8.7 9.6 11.3 40.5
metrics. More precisely, for each metric, we calculate the relative position of each
household in the welfare ordering and compare the different rankings by means of a
scatter plot. If all individuals are ranked in the same position for two metrics, the scatter
is displayed as a diagonal one. We compare all measures with the net income criterion.
The upper left panel, with the comparison between the Rente criterion and the
pure net income measure, shows that, not surprisingly, taking leisure into account
clearly matters. Although there is some concentration on the diagonal, the orderings
of the two measures clearly differ, but the introduction of variation in ethical priors
about how to weigh differences in preferences is obviously even more important. The
mREF-criterion with a reference wage of e 7 still correlates quite well with the Rente
criterion itself. Once we move to the Wage criterion mLF, the correlation is weak or
even non-existent.
The normative significance of this finding is further illustrated in Table 6. There
we answer the same question “who are the poor?” and “who are the better off?”
by describing the presence of households with certain characteristics in the different
quintiles of the welfare distribution produced by a given metric. We consider three
characteristics which are closely related to preference heterogeneity: living in East
Germany, having young children and being lowly educated.
The results are striking when reading the table across the different columns. Take
the first row, which shows the presence of East Germans in the bottom quintile of
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the welfare distribution, and remember that about 20 % of the sample is living in
East Germany. When the welfare ordering is based on disposable income alone, East
Germans are clearly overrepresented in the poorest quintile. They do work more, but
seemingly, their gross wages and their non-labour incomes are lower. Moving to the
second column (the Rente criterion) is a move towards a criterion which also takes
into account leisure. And yet, the harder working East Germans do not move down the
welfare ranking because they work more. The reason is that, under the Rente criterion,
they are pushed out of the bottom of the welfare distribution by those individuals who
have a more pronounced distaste for working. The Rente criterion favours individuals
with a distaste for work, ceteris paribus. Moving further to the right in the first row,
across the columns of the table, shows how sharply the share of East Germans increases
in the bottom quintile, when changing the ethical priors. When we hold individuals
more responsible for their preferences w.r.t. the labour-leisure choice, and introduce
a favourable treatment of the industrious relative to the work-averse individuals, the
policy analyst will find that the bottom quintile of the welfare ordering is filled with
66.3 % East Germans, which is more than double of the share with the Rente criterion.
The same story holds for the other characteristics. The share of households with
a lowly educated female in the bottom quintile, drops from 21.6 % under the Rente
criterion to 7.5 % under the Laissez Faire criterion. And the 12.5 % of the bottom
quintile which consists of households with children younger than three disappears
completely from the bottom of the distribution. They appear to be predominantly well
off (40.5 % of the top quintile) when the policy analyst considers their lower preference
for work not as a legitimate reason for redistribution.
The interpretation of these striking changes in the composition of the quintiles of
the distribution in Table 6 can, of course, be contaminated by correlation between the
different characteristics. In Table 7, we therefore investigate whether the above findings
are robust when we control for this correlation. We present results from multivariate
regressions of the different welfare metrics on observed characteristics, viz. by region,
education, presence of young children and non-labour income.20
The Rente criterion and the mREF-criterion are defined in terms of monthly non-
labour income. The Wage criterion mLF is expressed in its monthly full-time equiva-
lent. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted in monetary terms, although a direct
comparison of the wage criterion with the other ones requires caution. Overall, the
findings of Table 6 seem to be robust even after controlling for correlation between
the characteristics. We find strong and significant differences in the welfare metrics
by observed demographics which can be related to preference heterogeneity. Ceteris
paribus net income is higher for women in East German households, lower for lowly
educated females and lower for females with young children.21 When the policy ana-
lyst moves to the Rente criterion, East German women (who have a lower preference
for leisure) are judged to be even more better off than when using net income, and
20 Note that for comparability, we always use expected rather than observed household income.
21 The positive effect of the East German dummy on net income follows from the fact that we control for
non-labour income (i.e. mainly the income of the husband), which is higher for West German households.
A regression without this non-labour income as explanatory variable gives the expected negative sign for
the East German dummy on net income.
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Table 7 Regression of the
different welfare metrics on
demographic characteristics
Coefficients are obtained by
multivariate regressions of the
welfare metric in monetary
terms on demographic
characteristics. Standard errors
are between brackets. All
welfare measures are expressed
in Euros/1,000 per months.
Expected Welfare effects are
derived from simulated labour
supply behaviour. Source: SOEP,
wave 2005; Number of
observations: 2,077










East Germany 118 191 −49 −192
(23) (18) (19) (10)
Low education −169 −112 −92 −28
(28) (23) (24) (13)
Child younger
3
−212 −156 −41 385
(30) (24) (25) (14)
Child between
3 and 6
−243 −206 −123 111
(27) (22) (23) (12)
Age wife 3.5 1.0 4.6 7.2
(2.4) (1.9) (2.0) (1.1)
Age husband 5.0 5.0 4.1 1.4




456 452 473 209
(8) (7) (7) (4)
Constant 207 36 −65 44
(63) (51) (53) (29)
lowly educated females and females with young children (who have a strong pref-
erence for leisure) are considered less worse off, ceteris paribus, than when using
the income criterion. The striking result however is that, even when we control for
other observable characteristics, we do find rank reversals when switching to different
metrics. East Germans e.g. are, ceteris paribus, considered worse off when using the
reference wage, and also when using the wage criterion. This rightmost column of
Table 7 suggests that, when measured by the wage criterion, welfare is about 192
Euros lower for East Germans, ceteris paribus, whereas they were considered to be
191 euros better off by means of the Rente criterion. The opposite holds for females
in households with young children, and the welfare difference between the different
measures is even larger. Ceteris paribus a household with young children is consid-
ered to be 212 euros worse off with the net income criterion, but are 385 euros better
off with the wage criterion. We find these rank reversals for all characteristics. They
are outspoken for the presence of children, but individuals with less education are
no longer considered worse off neither, once the policy maker does no longer accept
that preference characteristics, leading to a lower willingness to work, are a legitimate
reason for redistribution.
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Tables 6 and 7 not only illustrate the importance of taking leisure into account in the
individual welfare measure. They also point to the importance of clearly specifying
and founding the normative choices underlying redistributive activities in a setting
where one respects preference heterogeneity.
4.3 Gainers and losers of a reform in work incentives
The previous section demonstrated how sensitive the welfare distribution is to nor-
mative principles in a setting which respects preference heterogeneity. However, in
practice, policy makers are often more interested in identifying gainers and losers of
policy reforms. To investigate whether the welfare difference is less sensitive to the
chosen ethical priors, we evaluate a reform of the social security contributions, imple-
mented in Germany in 2007. In particular, the contributions for unemployment insur-
ance were reduced from 6.5 % of individual gross earnings to 4.2 %.22 All employed
with earnings above the exemption level for social security contributions were affected
by this reform. Therefore, the induced labour supply incentives for married women
are a priori unclear. On the one hand, there is an income effect related to the increase
in net earnings of the husbands, but on the other hand, the direct effect for women
induced a substitution effect which should increase labour supply.
Similar to the calculation of the labour supply elasticities, we used the labour supply
model to determine the behavioural reaction of this reform in terms of the expected
labour supply effects and calculate the expected welfare metrics before and after the
reform as explained in Sect. 3.4.23 First, note that it is in fact possible to rely only
on ordinal utility information when describing the effects of a reform. This could
be done e.g. by identifying winners and losers of the reform. However, to reveal the
dependency on the normative choice of a welfare metric, we would also like to tabulate
the number (or proportion) of winners and losers on groupings which depend on the
chosen welfare metric. Unfortunately, since in the specific reform considered here,
everybody wins (the reform being not revenue neutral), this kind of tabulation would
not be informative at all. Therefore, in Table 8 we used the relative change in the
individual welfare metric to rank the individuals in an increasing order of welfare
gains. We partitioned the distribution of gains into quintiles and Table 8 describes the
composition of these quintiles in terms of characteristics that were found to be related
to preference heterogeneity.
The bottom quintile in Table 8 contains the households who have the smallest gain.
The top quintile is populated by the households with the largest gains. According to
the pure income measure which neglects leisure, East Germans are slightly underrep-
resented in the top quintile of gainers (18 % of this quintile consists of East Germans).
The reason is to be found in the fact that, on average, West German wives benefit more
22 The central idea of this reform was to reduce labour costs and therefore to improve the competitiveness
of the German economy. At the same time, VAT was increased from 16 to 19 %. Given that we do not model
consumption behaviour of individuals, we are unable to analyse the welfare effects of this second part of
the reform.
23 We find an increase in the expected female participation rate by 0.323 % in a 95 %-confidence interval
of [0.29 - 0.357] and an increase in the expected working hours by 1.02 % in a 95 %-confidence interval of
[0.95 - 1.108].
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Table 8 Composition of
quintiles of gainers and losers of
a change in work incentives
This table presents the
sub-population shares in the
quintiles of gainers and losers of
a reform based on different
welfare orderings. We consider a
reform consisting of a reduction
in the contributions for
unemployment insurance from
6.5 to 4.2 % of gross labour
earnings. Expected Welfare
effects are derived from
simulated labour supply
behaviour. Source: SOEP, wave
2005; Number of observations:
2,077











Share of East German households (20%)
1 31.7 30.0 27.6 46.6
2 19.8 15.4 16.4 23.6
3 18.5 16.6 17.1 14.9
4 14.0 20.0 18.6 9.9
5 18.1 20.0 22.4 7.0
Share of households with low education (11%)
1 24.0 22.1 22.4 15.9
2 14.7 16.1 16.1 17.1
3 10.1 10.6 10.6 13.5
4 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.8
5 1.2 1.0 1.0 3.4
Share of hh’s with children younger than 3 (11.5%)
1 23.8 20.2 23.3 8.2
2 13.0 14.7 14.2 7.7
3 9.4 7.9 9.4 9.1
4 9.6 13.3 10.1 10.6
5 1.9 1.7 0.7 22.2
from the reform than married women in the East, because of the income effect related
to the earnings of their husband. Sticking to this change in net income to identify
winners and loser, we find that the quintile of (relative) losers of the reform is domi-
nated by lowly educated people, and even more outspoken, by households with young
children. These results are of course directly related to the labour market participation
of these respective groups. The question is whether the identification of gainers and
losers is robust with respect to choice of the individual welfare metric.
We therefore move to the right in Table 8 to use metrics which take up leisure (and the
change therein) in the welfare metric, and fully account for preference heterogeneity
between the individuals. The share of East Germans amongst the gainers of the reform
remains close to 20 % when using the Rente criterion or the Reference Wage. However,
when focussing on the wage criterion (mLF), the share of East Germans is markedly
reduced from 18 to 7 %. This illustrates the crucial role of the slope of the indifference
curves (and hence the preference heterogeneity), not only in the calculation of the
welfare level, but also for the welfare difference. A given net income change translates
in a larger welfare gain (e.g. measured on the vertical axis at l = 0), the flatter the
indifference curve is. With the Rente criterion e.g. one not only considers people with
distaste for work as worse off in levels, one also considers that an increase in labour
income is valued less by them.
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The choice of metric also has an outspoken effect on where we classify the fam-
ilies with young children: the share in the lowest quintile (the relative losers) varies
between 20.2 and 8.2 % when switching from the Rente to the Wage criterion. The
difference is similar when focussing on the highest quintile. For education, the effect
is especially striking in the quintile of households that incur the largest loss. Lowly
educated households make up 24 % of the bottom quintile of the gainers distribution
when using the income criterion. But this reduces to 15.9 % when taking leisure into
account, and using the wage criterion.
5 Conclusion
Besides differences in budget sets, heterogeneity in preferences plays a crucial part in
explanatory models of labour supply. But the incompatibility between respecting het-
erogeneous preferences and interpersonal comparability has confined applied welfare
analysis to the case of comparability by means of a reference household or individual.
Sensitivity analysis of the robustness of empirical results with respect to the choice
of the reference household suggests that the choice of this reference preference is not
very important (Aaberge et al. 2004).
Introducing a reference preference ordering is, however, only one way to escape the
impossibility result. In this paper, we have followed a different route in the normative
part of the analysis by calculating welfare metrics which fully respect preference
heterogeneity but restrict the scope of interpersonal comparisons. We applied some of
the measures developed in Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011)
and highlighted their different underlying normative priors in the empirical context of
an estimated labour supply model. These by now standard discrete choice models of
labour supply reveal considerable preference heterogeneity and hence are excellent
candidates to illustrate the normative issues at hand. In this paper, we explored how
this positive information could be fed into the proposed metrics and shed light on the
empirical relevance of the choice to respect preference heterogeneity.
The results of the comparison of welfare orderings based on different metrics are
striking. Not the inclusion of leisure into the welfare metric plays the decisive role,
but the different normative treatment of the preference heterogeneity with respect to
the labour-leisure choice. This indicates that the robustness of results with respect to
the choice of the reference household in e.g. Aaberge et al. (2004) might have to do
more with the removal of preference heterogeneity than with a robustness as such.
The illustrative results have severe consequences for any policy advice which wants to
incorporate distributional analyses against the background of preference heterogeneity
(and respecting it). The answer to the question “who is worst-off” and “who is best-
off” inevitably has to face the question how to treat people with different preferences
differently. Does one consider preference characteristics as legitimate sources for
compensation or not? If the answer is affirmative, one might go for a normative analysis
based on, what is called in this paper, the Rente criterion. In that case, the difference
between welfare ordering based on disposable income and a metric which includes
leisure seems to be less important. If, however, one only considers differences in the
budget constraints, as legitimate reasons for redistribution, one might opt for the wage
123
Empirical welfare analysis with preference heterogeneity
criterion. The correlation between the ordering based on disposable income and this
wage criterion is very weak.
The purpose of this paper was not to discuss whether the observable preference
characteristics used in this application are indeed legitimate sources of compensation
and /or discrimination between individuals. Put even more generally, and as convinc-
ingly argued in Manski (2012), one can question whether at this stage our models
and data are sufficiently rich to consider preferences derived from these models as
sufficiently informative to evaluate policies. But we are convinced that this does not
diminish the relevance of the illustration provided in this paper. Quite the contrary.
The more progress we hopefully make in identifying and describing preference hetero-
geneity in the near future, the more urgent it becomes to properly integrate preference
heterogeneity in the normative framework.
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